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ADMIRALTY-WARRANTY OF SEAWORTHINESS-LONGSHOREMAN'S CHOICE OF 
REMEDIES-Plaintiff, employee of a stevedoring company hired to unload 
defendant's ship, was injured while operating a defective chisel truck1 in 
the ship's hold. The truck belonged to and was operated, maintained and 
brought aboard by the stevedoring company, the ship having no similar 
equipment. Furthermore, the stevedoring company was assumed to be 
aware of the defect prior to the accident. Plaintiff brought suit for damages 
against the shipowner alleging unseaworthiness, and the shipowner im-
pleaded the stevedoring company as a third-party defendant. On motion 
by the defendants for summary judgment, held, motion denied. The ship-
owner is liable on an absolute warranty of seaworthiness. Considine v. 
Black Diamond Steamship Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1958) 163 F. Supp. 107.2 
The plaintiff in the principal case had two main avenues of recovery 
open to him. First, he could recover against his employer, the stevedoring 
company, under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation 
Act.8 Originally the longshoreman could recover against his employer only 
as an ordinary employee. A 1926 Supreme Court ruling4 eliminated some 
of the harsh defenses available to the employer by placing the longshore-
man under the Jones Act.5 A year later Congress enacted the Longshore-
men's Act which set forth the employee's exclusive remedy against his em-
ployer, and gave the injured worker automatic recovery while limiting the 
liability of the employer in a manner similar to workmen's compensation. 
But the act preserved to the longshoreman his right to recover against third 
parties.6 The injured longshoreman was thus free to sue the shipowner 
under the doctrine of seaworthiness, as he did. This doctrine, as originally 
construed by our courts, 7 was based upon the shipowner-seaman employ-
ment contract8 in which the shipowner impliedly warranted to the seaman 
that the ship would be "in a fit state, as to repair, equipment, crew, and 
in all other respects to encounter the ordinary perils of the contemplated 
1 A dlisel truck is a hydraulically-operated-platformed, wheeled device for handling 
heavy bales and other cargo. 
2 In third-party-defendant suit, defendant-shipowner recovered in his own right for 
loss caused by the stevedoring company's negligence. Considine v. Black Diamond Steam-
ship Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1958) 163 F. Supp. 109. 
8 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. (1952; Supp. V, 1958) §§901-950. 
4 International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926). 
5 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §688, which gave to the seaman a remedy 
against his employer for negligence. 
6 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. (1952) §933. See generally Weinstock, 
"The Employer's Duty To Indemnify Shipowners for Damages Recovered by Harbor 
Workers," 103 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 321 (1954). 
7 For the history and development of the early unseaworthiness doctrine and other 
rights of seamen, see generally GIL!IIORE AND BLACK, THE LAW OF ADIIIIRALTY, c. VI (1957). 
8 See The Lizzie Frank, (S.D. Ala. 1887) 31 F. 477; Dixon v. The Cyrus, (D;C. Pa. 
1789) 7 Fed. Cas. 755, No. 3,930. 
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voyage.''9 The shipowner was not an insurer, however, but was liable only 
for a lack of due diligence in providing such a vessel.1° The seaworthiness 
doctrine, through recent judicial interpretation, has been greatly ex-
tended.11 The shipowner's duty to provide his seamen with a seaworthy 
vessel has become absolute,12 and extends to mistakes made by ship person-
nel as well as to defects in equipment.13 "Seaman" now generally includes 
any person aboard ship doing a seaman's work.14 Also, the original notion 
that seaworthiness should be limited to the ship and its appurtenant ap-
pliances has been broadened to cover equipment not even belonging to 
the ship.15 The injured party in the principal case, to use this doctrine, had 
merely to establish the relationship which qualified him as a "seaman" and 
an unseaworthy device which caused his injury. It was of no import that the 
equipment was brought on the ship by the stevedoring company itself. 
Through systematic rejection of the many attempted limitations to the 
seaworthiness doctrine,16 courts have carried this doctrine far beyond the 
basic proposition that the seaman should be adequately protected because 
of his complete dependence during a voyage on the seaworthiness of the 
vessel and its equipment.17 Plaintiff was thus able to sue the shipowner 
on an absolute liability basis and not have his recovery limited by the Long-
shoremen's Act. 
While application of the seaworthiness doctrine in the principal case is 
severe, the defendant shipowner was allowed to escape its harshness by re-
covering over from the stevedoring company.is In permitting a recovery 
9 See The Lizzie Frank, note 8 supra, at 480. 
10 See The Lizzie Frank, note 8 supra; The City of Alexandria, (S.D. N.Y. 1883) 17 
F. 390; Halverson v. Nisen, (D.C. Cal. 1876) 11 Fed. Cas. 310, No. 5,970. 
11 See generally Tetreault, "Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor 
Workers," 39 CoRN. L. Q. 381 (1954); comment, 67 YALE L. J. 1205 (1958). 
12 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); The H. A. Scandrett, (2d Cir. 
1937) 87 F. (2d) 708. 
13 See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., note 12 supra. 
14 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 
328 U.S. 85 (1946). It should be pointed out that there is apparently some confusion 
regarding what constitutes a "seaman's ,vork." See Tetreault, "Seamen, Seaworthiness, 
and the Rights of Harbor Workers," 39 CoRN. L. Q. 381 at 414-415 (1954). 
15 Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., (9th Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 478, affd. per curiam 347 
U.S. 396 (1954), note, 53 MICH. L. R..Ev. 126 (1954); Rogers v. United States Lines, (3d Cir. 
1953) 205 F. (2d) 57, revd. per curiam 347 U.S. 984 (1954). 
16 See note, 32 N.Y. UNIV. L. REV. 173 (1957); GILMORE AND BLACK, THE LAW OF 
ADMIRALTY, c. VI, p. 315 et seq. (1957). . 
17 The court in the principal case indicated its concern with the question whether 
there is a rational stopping place for further possible extensions of the unseaworthiness 
doctrine. "What is going to happen when the stevedore, who customarily carries his own 
personal tools, such as a bailing hook, brings aboard a defective one, and injures himself? 
Suppose he has an incompetent (as distinguished from merely negligent) fellow-employee? 
••• And if incompetent help makes a ship unseaworthy, what if a stevedore is injured 
by his own incompetence?" Principal case at 108, n. I. 
18 See note 2 supra. See Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 27 U.S. LAW WEEK 
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over, however, the courts in effect are nullifying the provisions of the ~ong-
shoremen's Act which seek to limit the stevedoring company-employer's 
liability. If it is assumed that Congress has set a fair and adequate compen-
s.ation for the injured longshoreman it is difficult to justify allowing his 
unlimited recovery, with resulting unlimited liability on the stevedoring 
company, simply by vir_tue of his bringing an action against a defendant 
who has contributed only slightly, if at all, to his injuries. Perhaps it has 
become necessary for Congress to clarify its intention regarding the rights 
and remedies of injured longshoremen. 
Richard E. Young 
4158 (1959), for recent Supreme Court approval of a shipowner being allowed to recover 
over from a negligent stevedoring company. 
